Questions One to Three. Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of Essence from the Fact it is under this Sort of Respect

1. About the thirty sixth distinction I ask whether the foundation of an eternal relation to God as knower [sc. the relation of the creature to God in the second instant, d.35 nn.32, 49] has truly the being of essence from the fact it is under this sort of respect.

That it does:

Man is not of himself a true or valid being [ens ratum] (because then he would be God), therefore he is formally valid through something; only through a respect to what is valid first of itself; but not by respect to it as to efficient cause, because since the definition is of a definite being, and an efficient cause ‘insofar as it is efficient’ produces something existing in act, if man had valid being from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient, the definition would only be of him as existing, and so the definition would answer the question ‘whether he is’, which is unacceptable;     therefore he is a valid being insofar as he participates the first thing as exemplar; but this is insofar as he has an eternal relation to God as knower and exemplar, - therefore etc     .

2. Further, correlatives are simultaneous in nature, -     therefore simultaneous in nature are God understanding a stone and a stone understood by him; therefore since a stone understood by the divine intellect is understood insofar as it is other than the divine essence, and this knowledge was real and metaphysical (not logical), then that which was the term of this intellection was a true thing; therefore etc     .

3. The opposite is stated by the Master in the text (d.36 ch.1 n.326). When expounding the authority of Augustine On Genesis V ch.18 n.36 (namely the authority “they were in the knowledge of God, they were not in their own nature”), he says as follows: “God had them” (namely the elect) “with him from eternity, not in their nature

(that is the nature of them, who did not yet exist), but in his fore-knowledge, because he knew them as if they existed.”

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

4. [Reasons for the opinion] - Here look at the opinion of Henry [of Ghent] about the eternity of essences, and specifically in Summa 21 q.4.a

a [Interpolation] Here some say [sc. Henry] that being taken most commonly - or thing - can be said to be from ‘think’ [Latin reor, thing in Latin is res], and thus it is common to figments and many other things. In another way, proceeding further, a thing is said to be from ‘ratitude’, as it is a ratified or valid thing and distinct from a fictitious thing; and this is double: for it is distinguished as thing to which being can belong or as thing to which being does belong, - and prior there is ‘to which being can belong’; and this thing, as it is by relation to the exemplar, is thus the essence, because just as God as efficient cause produces the thing in being of existence, so he produces it as exemplar in being of essence.

5. For this opinion the strongest argument is from what was touched on in the second principal argument, about the knowledge of God and the real eternal object [n.2].

6. There is added to this [n.5] that proportion is a property of being; but the proportion of an object known in eternity is something related to the knower, and the sort of thing that is ‘impossible to be’ is not so proportioned.

7. Further, as being is to non-being, so is possible to impossible - therefore by permutation [sc. being is to possible as non-being to impossible]; but every being is possible; therefore everything that is a pure non-being is impossible.

8. And there is a confirmation, because if some pure non-being (or a nothing) were possible, and some pure non-being (or a nothing) were impossible, one nothing would be more nothing than the other, which seems absurd; therefore a ‘possible’ is not altogether nothing but some being.

9. Further, Augustine On the Nature of the Good ch.18: “If good is some form, something not non-good is capacity for form;” therefore something not non-good is a possibility for actual goodness.

10. Again, On John homily 18 n.8: “Heart and mind form the same letters, but in different ways;”     therefore they are made by the heart before they are by the hand.

11. And Avicenna Metaphysics VIII ch.7, about the double flow of things from God [sc. according to the being of essence and the being of existence].

12. It is also added by them [sc. Henry etc     .] that the distinction of the being of essence from the being of existence [n.4] suffices for composition, because of the fact that essence (understood as having the being of essence) is still in potency to the being of existence, which it receives from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient - and then “it is composed of potency and act.”

13. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against these points the arguments are:

First, that creation is production from nothing; but if a stone pre-had from eternity true real being, then, when it is produced by the efficient cause, it is not produced from nothing simply.

14. Secondly as follows: if it is not produced save only according to a new respect to the efficient cause, it does not seem to be produced in being simply, but only in being in a certain respect - and the creation will be less ‘a production simply’ than is alteration, where there is production (at least of something) as to absolute being.

15. Third (according to the same way) it is argued that it posits the same actual and aptitudinal relation on the part of God, and that because of this there cannot, on account of the old aptitudinal relation, be a new actual relation in God [d.35 n.35]; therefore likewise on the part of what is referred to God there is the same actual and aptitudinal relation, and it will, on account of the old aptitudinal relation, not be an actual new one; therefore since the aptitudinal relation to the being of existence was always in a being having the being of essence, there will be no new actual relation in it insofar as it is existent.

16. Fourth (according to the same way), because in the same immutable foundation there cannot be a new respect; here the foundation is the same, namely the being of essence, - and an immutable term, namely God; therefore there is no new respect to such a term, of the sort of respect that is posited as ‘being of existence’.

17. Again, fifth (according to the same middle term, about creation [sc. creation from nothing, n.13]), because the production of a thing according to the being of essence is most truly creation (for it is purely from nothing as from the term from which, and to a true being as to the term to which); and this production according to them is eternal [n.12]; therefore the creation is eternal, - the opposite of which he [sc. Henry] tries to show and says he has demonstrations for.

18. Sixth (according to the same way, through the opposite about annihilation), it follows that nothing can be annihilated; for just as it is produced from a being in essence, so it seems to return to a being in essence, - not to nothing.

19. Further, second principally [sc. after the arguments in nn.13-18]: the reasons -which were touched on in distinction 8 nn.263, 269 against Avicenna - that ‘nothing other than God is formally necessary’, can be made against this opinion [sc. the opinion about the being of essence from eternity, n.4], because these reasons are as conclusive about quidditative being (if it is true being) as about the being of existence; for the will does not more necessarily will ‘something other than itself’ in quidditative being than it wills ‘something other than itself’ in being of existence, because there is the same reason in both cases [d.8 nn.270, 272] - and so about the other middle terms there [d.8 nn.271, 273-274].

20. Further, third: a thing according to being of essence is either the term of a relation of the idea (which they posit in God) or it is not but is according to some other known being. If in the second way, then things are posited in vain in the former being; for essences do not seem to be posited because of anything other than as they are terms of the ideal relations that are eternally in God. If in the first way, then there is in God by act of the divine intellect something according to which God can be otherwise or change, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 30 n.41. - The proof of this last inference is that every ‘being’ other than God is formally non-necessary of itself; therefore let this ‘being’ (although per impossibile) be posited to be quidditatively otherwise, it follows that the entity in God - whether it is real or of reason -, which has this ‘being’ for term, will be otherwise, and thus from the positing of something about what is other than God something that is in God by act of his intellect will be able to be changed, which is impossible.

21. Further, when a cause is perfect and naturally independent in causing and it acts naturally, it seems that it can cause the things more immediate to it to be more perfect, because it produces according to the ultimate of its power; the divine intellect as intellect precisely - according to this way - produces in God ideal reasons and the essences themselves in reason of essence, and produces ideal reasons as it were first in itself before these essences in this being (for they exist by the fact they are of the exemplars); therefore the ideas have a truer being - since the divine intellect is naturally acting - than the things patterned after them; but the divine intellect does not cause ideas save as ‘beings of reason’ and not in any real being - therefore neither does he give any real being to the things patterned after the ideas, which things are more remote ‘caused things’ as it were.

22. Besides, fifth: it produces these essences in being either knowingly or not. If knowingly, then they are in the knower before they are in this being, and so in vain are these entities [sc. ideas] posited on account of God’s eternal knowledge. If not knowingly, then he produces them merely naturally (as fire heats), which seems absurd about any produced thing that is other than himself in nature; nay he even produces the Son as he is intellect, although not as understanding formally, as was expounded elsewhere [d.2 nn.290-296].

23. In addition, that he [sc. Henry] attributes one effect to the exemplar cause and another to the efficient cause does not seem probable, because the exemplar cause is only a certain efficient cause; for the efficient cause is divided into efficient cause by intellect or intention and efficient cause by nature, according to the Philosopher Physics 2.5.196b17-22. Just as therefore a natural producer is not a different cause from the efficient cause, so neither is the exemplar cause or the exemplar producer - and so ‘what is effected’ will be the same as ‘what is produced as exemplified’ by any understanding that produces artificially, insofar as it is understanding and insofar as it is exemplar.

24. Also as to what he adds ‘that composition exists in creatures through this potentiality to act’ [n.12] does not seem rational, because there seems to be nothing there that may be compared with something else; for if the whole of whiteness pre-exists in potency as the term of power, and afterwards it comes to be in act, not for this reason is there any composition of thing and thing; therefore if a thing pre-exists in being of essence and it is produced in being of existence (which is not different - according to them - from the essence, just as neither generally is a relation different from its foundation, for which reason they do not posit that relation and foundation make a composition), there will not be a composite being because of these two.

25. And this might be the seventh argument (according to the first way [nn.13-18]) for rejecting creation, because of the identity of relation with the foundation [n.24]; because the same thing cannot be really new and not new; therefore if being of existence states a relation that is the same as essence, no creature will be simply new.

B. Scotus’ own Response

26. I concede the conclusion of these reasons [nn.13-18, 25], namely the negative part of the question [n.24].

27. As to which, this result seems specifically to hold, that not only does the being of essence found this sort of relation to God but so also does the being of existence, because according to Augustine On Genesis V ch.18 n.36: “he knows things made no otherwise than he knows things to be made;” he foreknew then the being of existence just as he foreknew the being of essence - and yet not because of this founded relation does someone conclude that the ‘being of existence’ was a true such being, namely true being of existence from eternity; therefore by parity of reason, it should not be conceded of the being of essence.

28. Also all the motives that are adduced about the divine intellect seem able to be adduced about our intellect:

Because if something does not exist, it can be understood by us (and this as to either its essence or its existence), and yet not because of our intellection does one posit that it has true being of essence or of existence; nor is there any difference - as it seems -between the divine intellect and ours in this respect, save that the divine intellect produces those intelligibles in their intelligible being, and ours does not produce them first. But if this being is not of itself such that it requires being simply, then ‘to produce it in such being’ is not to produce it in any being simply; and therefore it seems that if this intelligible being - when comparing it to our intellect - does not require being simply, then when comparing it also to the intellect ‘producing it in this being’ there will not be being simply, because if being white is only qualitative being, then ‘to produce it in being white’ is not to produce in being substance but in that qualitative being.

29. Likewise, our agent intellect produces a thing in intelligible being, although it was produced beforehand - and yet not because of this producing of our agent intellect is the thing ‘so produced’ posited to have being simply.

C. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

30. [Exposition of the objections] - Against this solution it is objected that the foundation of a relation, when it founds a relation, exists according to the being according to which it founds, - otherwise it would not found according to that being; but a stone according to true being of essence founds the eternal relation to God as knower, and this in eternity; therefore the stone exists in eternity according to this being. Proof of the minor: it founds the relation to God as knower according to the being according to which its being as object is known by God; but it is known by God under the idea of true essence, not under the idea of diminished essence, because the first intellection of a stone by God is not reflexive.

31. Further, production is not of some relation merely, because relation only exists in something absolute; therefore since it was conceded in the preceding question [d.35 nn.31-32, 40, 42] that God produces things in intelligible being ‘according as the known thing is said to be an idea’, it follows that in the second instant [ibid., nn.32, 49] one must posit some absolute entity of the produced thing, so that on the absolute being having such entity the relation to the producer may be founded.

32. [Response to the objections] - To the first [n.30] I say that a canceled term is not canceled with respect to the canceling term but with respect to a third to which it is compared under the reason of what cancels, - because according to the Philosopher De Interpretatione 11.21a21-24, when predicating of someone that he is ‘a dead man’ there is an opposition in the adjective, on which contradiction follows [sc. a dead man is not in fact a man]; therefore when comparing a determinable precisely to the determination, the determinable is not canceled with respect to the determination but includes a contradiction to it; but with respect to the third term - about which ‘dead’ is said - there is a canceling determination and that which is determined by it is canceled, so that it is only said to be it ‘in a certain respect’ [sc. a dead man is not a man simply but a man in a certain respect, as a body that was a man].

33. Thus I say that a diminished thing is not diminished with respect to the diminishing term but with respect to a third, to which it is compared under the diminishing determination; just as when I say ‘he is white as to his teeth’, the white is not diminished but is taken for white simply with respect to this determination (otherwise it would be frivolous); but, as it is taken under the determination, it is said of a third thing -as of an Ethiopian - as diminished.

34. Now this determination ‘to be in opinion’ is a diminishing one (according to the Philosopher, ibid. 21a24-33), and the way being in opinion is, so being in intellection also is or being from an exemplar or being known or represented, - all which are equivalent. Although therefore what is compared to any one of these, as it is compared to it, is not diminished - yet as it is under any of these compared to a third, it is diminished; for the being of man simply - and not diminished being - is the object of opinion, but the ‘being simply’ as it exists in opinion is being ‘in a certain respect’; and therefore the inference does not follow ‘Homer is in opinion, therefore Homer is’, nor even ‘Homer is existing in opinion, therefore Homer is existing’ - but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect.

35. So here: when comparing to divine intellection a stone in eternity, the stone is indeed simply compared to the intellection (and this according to the being not only of essence of the stone, but also of existence), and anything comparable is so compared -yet as it is taken under this comparison to the knowledge of God it is diminished; it is not indeed canceled, as if ‘being simply’ could not stand with this sort of respect, but it is diminished so that such respect does not necessarily posit that ‘its determinable’ is a being simply.

36. Next to the form of the argument [n.30]: ‘the foundation of a relation is according to the being according to which it founds the relation’ is true when the founded relation is not simply diminishing the being of the foundation. And the real reason for the ‘in a certain respect and simply’ seems to be this, that the first distinction of being seems to be into being outside the soul and being in the soul, - and the ‘outside the soul’ can be distinguished into act and potency (of essence and of existence), and any of these beings ‘outside the soul’ can have being in the soul, and the being ‘in the soul’ is other than every ‘being outside the soul’ and therefore about no entity nor about any being does it follow that, if it has diminished being in the soul, it has because of this being simply -because the being is in a certain respect, absolutely, which however is taken ‘simply’ insofar as it is compared to the soul as foundation of the being in the soul.

37. Argument [sc. against nn.35-36]:

A stone is not of itself a necessary existence in any existence;[Text canceled by Scotus] This does not follow, if it is a true being, and not divisible into necessary and possible. ⁵ therefore in being known it is caused; only by an efficient cause - whose term is only being simply.

38. Again what is only in something virtually is never formally such save through actual causation; a stone ‘as known’ is only virtually in the divine essence; therefore it does not become actually known without causation - and then as before [n.37].

39. In response to these [nn.37-38]:

One can respond otherwise than is responded here above [nn.35-36], namely that the intellection of God, although it is not absolutely caused, yet as it is of this secondary object (to wit, a stone) does as it were have a principle, and this from the essence as an equivocal objective formal nature - and so it is more from a principle then when it is of the first object because in this latter way it is from a principle as from a univocal objective formal nature. And to be an intellection, as it is ‘of this’, as from a principle equivocally is for the ‘this’ to have a principle in diminished being, just as for an intelligible species to be from a principle in the intellect is for the object ‘in a certain respect’ to be from a principle as it is actually intelligible, or - a better example for the purpose - in the way that through the species of the subject ‘the intellection of the property is from a principle’ is for the property as actually understood to be from a principle; therefore this example is fitting, because a stone does not have a principle equivocally from the essence as intelligible first before it does so as understood; for nothing has formal being in the memory before it does so in intelligence, but only virtual being. Nor does it seem unacceptable to concede that the divine intellect has as it were a principle (not in itself, but as it is of this object), because one must posit this about volition (as it seems), since volition is contingently of this object, and nothing contingent is altogether uncaused.

40. Thus there will be an order between the altogether without a principle (as the essence) and the from a principle univocally (as the intellection of the essence) and the as it were from a principle equivocally but necessarily (as the intellection of a stone) and the as it were from a principle equivocally and contingently (as the willing of a stone).

41. This way well says, in this regard, that the essence as ‘moving reason’ is altogether without distinction, univocally as it were when moving to itself as to first term of act, and equivocally as it were when moving to a secondary object as to second term of act; such that neither in the intellect (as is plain) nor in motive reason nor in understanding nor in the first term must one posit any distinction. But when it is said ‘the act is as it were equivocally from a principle as it is of a secondary object’ [n.39], this is nothing other than that it is extended - as if beyond the first object - to the second in virtue of an objective principle that is equivocal to the second term.

42. But what is it for an act to be thus extended? Not to be a relation in act, nor to be a relation in the first object to the second, - for you [sc. Scotus himself]; therefore it is for the second object to be referred to the act or the first object; this object is only of what possesses some being [sc. diminished being], - and then follows what is had there [nn.35-36].

43. So the imagination is false that ‘to understand’ is distinguished (so that it might be of many things) as if into many ‘to understands’; nay there is no need for any difference in it, as it is a sort of mean between reason and the first term, which secondary objects follow;     therefore it is false that the secondary objects are the immediate term of

‘to understand’, just as neither do they move - for in no way are they necessarily required for act, but they are required in idea of term, to the act as it is of this; this only asserts a relation in the second mode.a

a [Note of Duns Scotus] God: intellect, essence as reason; to understand: essence as first term, -stone, angel etc     ., secondary objects.

44. To the second [n.31] I say that this production is in the being of a reason different from all being simply, - and it is not being of reason simply, but also of the foundation; not indeed according to the being of essence or existence, but according to diminished being (which is ‘to be’ true), which is a to be in a certain respect also of absolute being, which ‘absolute being’, however, according to this diminished being has a relation of reason as concomitant.

45. An example of this: if Caesar were annihilated and yet there were a statue of Caesar, Caesar would be represented by the statue. This ‘being represented’ is of a reason different from all being simply (whether of essence or existence), nor is it a diminished being of Caesar, as if something of Caesar had this being and something of him did not -as an Ethiopian is diminished white because something of him is truly white and something not [n.33]. But of the whole Caesar ‘the being of him from a cause’ is true being of essence and of existence, and to that whole - according to such being of his -this being in a certain respect belongs, and in him, according to this being in a certain respect, there can be some relation to the statue.

46. And although one could suppose there to be calumny in the example, it cannot thus be said in the issue at hand about intellection and the object without the whole object, and in accord with its whole being, having ‘diminished being’ in act. And if you wish to look for some true being of this object as such, there is none to look for save ‘in a certain respect’, save that this ‘being in a certain respect’ is reduced to some being simply, which is the being of the intellection itself; but this ‘being simply’ is not formally the being of that which is called the ‘being in a certain respect’, because it is of it as term or principle, so that to this ‘true being in a certain respect’ is thus reduced the fact that without this true being of it there would not be this ‘being in a certain respect’ of it.

47. Now from this becomes clear something said above in distinction 3 nn.265-267 (‘About knowledge in the eternal rules’), namely that the moving of our intellect ‘by intelligible quiddities’ is reduced to the divine intellect, through whose ‘being simply’ those objects have being in a certain respect, namely objective being (which is the being that moves our intellect to know genuine truths), and because of their motion the intellect is said to move, just as too they have ‘their own being in a certain respect’ because of the being simply of it.

II. To the Principal Arguments

48. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that ‘valid being’ is either called so because it has of itself firm and true being, whether of essence or existence (because one is not without the other, however they are distinguished), or ‘valid being’ is called so because it is what is first distinguished from figments, namely to which the true being of essence or of existence is not repugnant.

49. If valid being is taken in the first way, I say that man is not of himself a valid being but from his efficient cause - from which he has all true being, both of essence and of existence. And when you say that then there is never a valid being unless it has been efficiently caused, - I do in this way concede it: and when it has been efficiently caused it is existent, therefore there is never a valid being save an existent one, - I concede it; therefore there is no definition of it save as it is existent, - I deny this inference, because definition is a distinct knowledge of the defined thing according to all its essential parts. But there can be distinct knowledge of something although it is not a valid being; for it is only necessary that a valid being be the term of a definitive cognition, and then the inference does not follow ‘a valid being is definitively understood, therefore the valid being exists’.

50. If valid being is understood in the second way, I say that man is of himself a valid being, because being is not formally of itself repugnant to him; for just as whatever something is repugnant to, it is repugnant to it formally from its nature, so what it is not repugnant to formally it is not repugnant to because of its nature; and if being were of itself repugnant to man, it could not be repugnant to him because of some additional respect. And if from this you infer ‘man is of himself a valid being in this way, therefore he is God’, the inference is not valid, because God is not only he to whom being is not repugnant but he is of himself being itself.

51. As to what is said here that man is formally a valid being by some relation, which is the validity of him [n.1], it was rejected in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the vestige’ nn.310-323. And it seems very absurd because - according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2 - if nothing exists to itself, nothing exists to another; and this they themselves concede, because a relation cannot be founded in a relation but in an absolute.

52. I ask then about the foundation of such relation, which is said to be the validity; let it be called a. If it is to itself, then it does not essentially include in its understanding a per se respect, because nothing that essentially includes a respect is to itself formally. This a insofar as it is to itself is either valid, and then I have the intended conclusion, - or it is not valid, and then the respect will be founded in a non-valid being; and a respect for them is the same as the foundation, therefore the respect is the same as a non-valid being. And the consequent is very much unacceptable, if ‘valid’ is taken for that which being is not repugnant to, because it would follow that the validity will not be founded on a non-valid thing, which is ‘nothing’ - and so the respect will be a ‘nothing’, and then a valid being will be from two nothings.

53. To the second argument [n.2] I concede that from eternity God has understood stone, and not as the same as himself, - and this intellection was real and metaphysical, not logical. Yet it does not more follow - from this - about the stone that it is essence rather than existence, nor when comparing it to the divine intellect rather than to mine; the inference does indeed follow ‘therefore the thing was always understood’, but to argue ‘therefore the thing was in some real being’ is the fallacy of in a certain respect and simply.

III. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others

54. Using the same point in response to what is adduced for the opinion, about proportion to intellect [n.6] - I say that this proportion is a relation of the thing known to the knower, and this relation is the diminished being on which it is founded, as has been made clear [nn.34-35]; but it is not necessary that the ‘diminished being’ relation require along with it the entity simply of the being which it determines. And when you say there is no such proportion ‘of the impossible’ to the divine intellect [n.6], - I say that it can well be that the altogether black is not white, and yet not for this reason is ‘a man white in teeth’ simply white; so it can be that an im-proportion in every way is ‘impossible’ to the divine intellect, and yet that some proportion is ‘possible’ to his intellect, but not through being simply.

55. To the point about permutation of proportion [n.7], I say that that way of arguing takes its rise from Euclid, in the sixteenth conclusion of the fifth book: “If,” he says, “four quantities were proportional, they will be proportional by permutation;” which is proved by the fifteenth, preceding conclusion: “The proportion of multiples and of sub-multiples is the same.”

56. And this permutation, certain and known in the case of quantities, is used by some people in arguments. Now the Philosopher used it in Prior Analytics 2.22.68a3-8, 11-16 (in two rules): ‘If a is converse of b and c of d, and if a and c contradict, then and b and d will contradict’ and conversely. The consequence is necessary because about anything one or other of a pair of contradictories is said; and because what is convertible with one contradictory does not receive the predication of the other (nor conversely), therefore it is the converse of the other contradictory. And generally whenever some true proportion (corresponding to the fifteenth conclusion of Euclid) can be got through which a permutation holds (corresponding to the sixteenth conclusion), then the permutation is good, - and when not, not.

57. To the issue at hand then: generally such a permutation never holds when comparing extremes to an inferior and superior; nay there is a fallacy of the consequent, because the extremes of two contradictions when compared with each other have a converse proportion in inferences and not the same one (for the opposite of the consequent entails the opposite of the antecedent and not conversely), and therefore to argue ‘as the first is to the third, so the second is to the fourth’ commits the fallacy of the consequent. But one should argue conversely (when drawing inferences), and so argue thus, ‘as the first is to the third, so the fourth is to the second’, - and so in the issue at hand, ‘as every being is possible, so every impossible is a non-being’.

58. And as to what is added there, that then ‘one nothing would be more nothing than another nothing’ [n.8], - I reply:

A negation is present in something in three ways. Sometimes not because of repugnance of the positive to the affirmation of the negative of it, but only because of the negation of the cause that posits the effect - just as if some surface were neither [sc. neither black nor white], it would indeed be non-white not because of the repugnance of the surface to the affirmation opposite to this negation, but only because of the negation of the cause, not positing whiteness to be present on the surface. But sometimes there is a negation in a positive because of its repugnance to the affirmation and to the opposite of that negation, and this in two ways: for sometimes there is precisely such a repugnance because of some one thing that belongs to the understanding of both - just as in the ultimate species of the same proximate genus their negations are said mutually of each other, because of their repugnance, which repugnance is however because of one thing included in the understanding of both, namely because of the ultimate embracing difference; but sometimes because of several things included in the understanding of both or of one of them, - just as, if the most special species be taken of two most general genera, the affirmations are indeed repugnant to each other because of the many things included in them, namely as many as are the predicates stated in the ‘what’ of each one in its own genus; for nothing is said in the ‘what’ of white which is not a middle term for showing this proposition ‘man is not whiteness’, also nothing is said of man in the ‘what’ which is not a middle term for showing the same proposition - and therefore this proposition ‘man is not whiteness’ is true because of the repugnance of the terms simply, or because of the many things included in the understanding of the repugnant things, each of which would be on either side a sufficient reason for such repugnance.

59. And yet in all these inherences in negations, although they are present from diverse causes, nothing is said to be more or less negated, but that each simply is ‘not such’; for flavor is simply as much nothing of whiteness as man is, and likewise a surface has nothing of whiteness, in the case posited above [n.58]; and the reason why this one is not more a negation than that one is because any negation negates the whole of the affirmation opposed to it, for whatever reason it is ‘such’, and whether because of one reason or several.

60. So in the issue at hand: in man in eternity there is present that ‘he is not anything’, and in chimaera there is present that ‘it is not anything’; but the affirmation ‘he is something’ is not repugnant to man but there is only negation because of negation of the cause, not positing it - but the affirmation is repugnant to a chimaera, because no cause could cause in it that ‘it is something’. And the reason that this is not repugnant to man and is repugnant to chimaera is that this is this and that is that, and this for any intellect conceiving them, because - as was said [n.50] - whatever is repugnant to something formally of itself is repugnant to it, and what is not repugnant formally of itself is not repugnant.

61. Nor is it necessary to imagine here that it is not repugnant to man because he is a being in potency and is repugnant to a chimaera because it is not a being in potency, - nay rather conversely, because it is not repugnant to man therefore he is a possible with logical potency and because it is repugnant to a chimaera therefore a chimaera is impossible with the opposite impossibility; and this possibility is followed by objective possibility, and that on the supposition of God’s omnipotence which has regard to everything possible (provided it is other than himself), yet that logical possibility can stand - by reason of itself - absolutely, although per impossibile no omnipotence were to have regard to it.

62. Therefore the reason altogether first and irreducible to another as to why ‘being’ is not repugnant to man is that man is formally man (and this whether really in itself or intelligibly in the intellect), and the first reason why ‘being’ is repugnant to a chimaera is the chimaera insofar as it is a chimaera. Therefore the negation ‘nothingness’ is present in different ways in eternity in man and in a chimaera, and yet not for this reason is one more a nothing than the other.

63. Or it could also be said that from man is removed only being and nothing else consequent on being (of the sort that ‘possible to be’ is), but from chimaera is removed being and its consequent; and therefore ‘being’ is negated of a chimaera for more reasons than it is negated of man, but this negation is not more in one than in the other. But the first response [nn.61-62] seems more real.

64. To Augustine [n.9]: capacity for form - according to him - is matter, because it has some true entity, and not only some such entity as the soul of Antichrist has before it is created. About this in the second book, distinction 12 q. un. nn.1-9.

65. To the remark from On John [n.9]: I concede that, when there are two ordered causes, both cause the effect, - and in different ways because the higher one causes more; and so if the heart is the higher cause and the hand a lower one with respect to letters, each causes (both the heart and the hand), but it is not the case that the heart produces the letters in some true being before the hand does and that the hand later adds to them some respect!

66. To the last one from Avicenna [n.11]: he is speaking of the flowing of forms from God insofar as these are understood, and of the flowing of everything that exists (that is, the flow of things in true being); and I concede that just as the ‘being’ of something understood insofar as it is understood is different from true being (which is of essences outside the soul), so ‘this and that’ flowing are different, and things flow from God by each flowing. It is not so in us because the things pre-exist outside the soul - or in the cause - so that they may then move our intellect to an act of understanding. But Avicenna does not say that the flow ‘in understood being’ is the flow in quidditative being, because ‘understood being’ is a distinct being from all real being, both quidditative and of existence.